Washington DC Injury Lawyer Blog

The Summary Judgment Standard in Washington, D.C. Personal Injury Cases

December 16, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

The Washington, D.C. judicial system is designed to handle all of the disputes arising in the District and, at times, can get fairly backed up. In particular, cases that end up going to trial take up a lot of a court’s resources. For this reason, courts implement certain rules to ensure that only meritorious cases end up going to trial. The most common method by which cases get weeded out prior to trial is through summary judgment.

Summary judgment is a phase of the trial process in which a judge is asked by one party to enter judgment in favor of that party before the case gets presented to a jury. In Washington, D.C., in order for a judge to properly grant a party’s motion for summary judgement, the judge must determine that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Importantly, all reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. This means that if a defendant moves for summary judgment, all matters of witness credibility and other potential unresolved inferences must be made in favor of the plaintiff. In other words, if the judge assumes everything the plaintiff claims is true, and the plaintiff is still not entitled to judgment, summary judgment in favor of the defendant should be granted. A recent premises liability case illustrates how summary judgment may be used by a defendant to get a case dismissed at an early stage.

Plaintiff’s Product Liability Case Allowed to Proceed Under Strict Liability Theory

December 9, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, a federal appellate court issued a written opinion in a product liability case filed by a man who was injured when the solution he was using to clean his basement floor erupted into flames. In the case, Suarez v. W.M. Barr & Company, the plaintiff brought both a failure-to-warn claim as well as a general negligence claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of the failure-to-warn claim but held that there was an issue of triable fact regarding the negligence claim.

The Facts of the Case

Suarez purchased a gallon of the defendant’s Goof Off product to clean his basement floors. Suarez read the warnings on the product’s packaging and accordingly opened doors and windows in the basement to ventilate the area. While following the packaging’s instructions, the product caught fire, severely burning Suarez. Suarez then filed a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer of Goof Off. Specifically, he claimed that the warning on the product’s packaging was inadequate and also that the product was unreasonably dangerous.

Suarez presented experts who testified that the active ingredient in Goof Off, acetone, could have been agitated, causing the fire. However, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both claims, and Suarez appealed to a higher court.

Plaintiff’s Premises Liability Case Against Municipality Dismissed Due to Late Filing

December 2, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, an appellate court in North Dakota issued a written opinion affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff’s premises liability case against a city because the case was filed after the applicable statute of limitations. In the case of Frith v. City of Fargo, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a longer statute of limitations should apply because the condition that caused her injury was created by a third party rather than the city named in the lawsuit.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff was injured in July 2012 while rollerblading in a park owned and operated by the City of Fargo. According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped over a soft patch of pavement that had recently been placed to cover up a crack. The paving had been completed not by a city employee but by a third-party independent contractor.

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the city only. She claimed that the city’s negligence in failing to deal with the hazard caused her injuries. The lawsuit was within three years of the accident, but the plaintiff failed to properly serve the city, so the initial case was dismissed. The plaintiff then refiled the lawsuit and properly served the defendant in October 2015.

Court Reverses Defense Verdict in Medical Malpractice Case Due to Inadmissible Expert Testimony

November 30, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, a federal appellate court issued a written opinion in a medical malpractice case, reversing the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant and ordering the lower court to conduct a previously overlooked analysis. In the case, Hall v. Flannery, the court reversed the jury’s verdict based on the fact that the defendant’s expert witness did not possess the proper training and experience to offer expert testimony on the subject on which he testified.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff’s 17-year-old child passed away three days after having a surgery to repair a skull injury she sustained as a child. The exact circumstances of the girl’s death were uncertain. However, the medical examiner determined that a seizure was the likely cause of death. After her daughter’s death, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the doctor who performed the surgery, claiming that her daughter should have been prescribed anti-seizure medication prior to being discharged from the hospital.

The defendant notified the court that several expert witnesses would testify on his behalf. In response to the designation of the defendant’s witnesses, the plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to limit the experts’ testimony. Specifically, the plaintiff wanted to prevent the experts from testifying as to the cause of death. The plaintiff claimed that the experts did not have sufficient qualifications to make that determination.

Court Holds Plaintiff Does Not Need to Release Unused Expert Witness’ Report

November 15, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, an appellate court in Missouri issued a written opinion in a personal injury case brought by a man who was injured when he crashed and rolled his utility terrain vehicle (UTV), and the roof collapsed. In the case, Malashock v. Jamison, the court’s opinion analyzed the application of the “attorney work product” doctrine, which requires that an attorney’s work on a client’s case remain confidential unless the privilege is waived. Specifically, the court held that designating an expert witness and then choosing not to use the expert’s testimony does not waive the attorney work product privilege.

The Facts of the Case

Malashock crashed the UTV that he purchased from the defendant. During the crash, the UTV rolled, and the roof collapsed, injuring Malashock. Malashock then filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant, seeking compensation for his injuries.

In preparation for the case, Malashock designated four expert witnesses to help him prove his case against the defendant. As a part of the designation process, Malashock provided a brief description of the areas each expert would discuss at trial. However, two weeks later, he reconsidered and decided not to use one of the experts. At no time were the specifics of the unused expert’s testimony made known to the defendant.

Man Injured in Hotel Slip-and-Fall Accident Seeks to Hold Hotel Liable

November 8, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, an appellate court in Kentucky issued a written opinion in a premises liability case involving a man who slipped and fell while trying to get into the shower at the defendant hotel. In the case, Goodwin v. Al J. Schneider, the court held that the lower court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for his own failure to take reasonable precautions in entering the shower. Specifically, the state’s high court held that the lower courts mistakenly determined that the defendant did not have a duty to protect Goodwin.

The Facts of the Case

Goodwin and his wife were staying at the defendant hotel for a conference. On the second day of his stay, Goodwin fell while he was entering the shower. Evidence presented at trial showed that the bathroom did have a hand rail to assist guests in entering the shower, but it did not have a bath mat. However, other rooms in the hotel had both a bath mat and a hand rail. Goodwin filed a premises liability lawsuit against the hotel, seeking compensation for the injuries he sustained in the fall. He claimed that the hotel should have provided additional protection and that the hotel’s failure to do so was negligent.

The trial court hearing the case granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement, stating that the hotel did not have a duty to provide bath mats in all rooms and that the hotel is not “an insurer of a guest’s safety.” The court reasoned that a wet shower is an “open and obvious” hazard, and the defendant did not have a duty to remedy the hazard. The court of appeals affirmed.

Trampoline Park’s Contract Mandating Arbitration Found to Be Unenforceable

November 2, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, one state’s supreme court issued a written opinion summarily affirming a lower court’s decision that the contract the defendant trampoline park required patrons to sign was a contract of adhesion and thus unenforceable. As a result of the court’s decision, the plaintiffs will be permitted to continue with their case in a court of law, rather than proceed through arbitration.

Alicea v. Activelaf: The Facts

The Aliceas arranged to take their two young sons to a trampoline park owned by the defendant. Prior to being admitted into the park, Mrs. Alicea was required to electronically sign a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” form. The form contained what claimed to be a binding arbitration clause, whereby anyone who signed the form would be prohibited from filing a case in a court of law against the trampoline park. Instead, the dispute would be resolved through an arbitration company. The form also included a clause stating that any person who did file a lawsuit against the trampoline park agreed to pay the park a $5,000 fee plus interest.

On-the-Job Injuries May Result in Personal Injury Claims

October 25, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Generally speaking, whenever a worker is injured on the job, he is entitled to benefits though the Workers’ Compensation program. While Workers’ Compensation offers injured employees benefits roughly equivalent to what they were making while they were able to work, there is no possibility to seek damages above and beyond this amount.

In addition, in many cases, an injured worker’s sole remedy is through Workers’ Compensation, meaning that an injured worker cannot both obtain benefits through Workers’ Compensation and also file a personal injury lawsuit against his employer. However, in some cases, an injured worker will not be prohibited from filing a personal injury lawsuit against his employer or an allegedly negligent third party. A recent case in front of a federal court of appeals illustrates this concept.

Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding: A Third Party’s Actions Result in a Plaintiff’s Workplace Injury

Schaefer was an employee of Brand Energy, a construction company. One day, Schaefer was injured when a piece of scaffolding came loose, striking him on the head. Schaefer filed a claim for Workers’ Compensation as well as a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer of the scaffolding, alleging that the scaffolding was defective.

Executive of Peanut Company Sentenced to Prison for Knowingly Distributing Tainted Product

October 18, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

A former executive of a peanut company was recently sentenced to 28 years in prison for his role in distributing tainted peanut butter back in 2008 and 2009 that made dozens of people seriously ill and killed several others. According to one industry news source reporting on the criminal case, this marked the first time that an executive was prosecuted criminally in a food poisoning case.

Evidently, the prosecution submitted evidence that the executive signed off on shipments of peanut butter that he knew to be tainted. He also submitted fraudulent lab tests, claiming that the product had been tested for salmonella. When investigators conducted an inspection of the facility, they discovered leaking roofs, cockroaches, and evidence of a rodent infestation.

Establishing Civil Liability After a Criminal Prosecution

While the case discussed above was a criminal prosecution, it may have laid the groundwork for the families who were affected by the tainted peanut butter to seek financial compensation through a civil lawsuit. Manufacturers of all products, including food, assume a duty to ensure that the products they sell are reasonably safe. When a product causes an injury to a customer, or tainted food is consumed and results in an illness, the manufacturer may be held liable.

Appellate Court Finds Sufficient Evidence to Uphold Plaintiffs’ Verdict in Medical Malpractice Case

October 12, 2016 | Lebowitz & Mzhen

Earlier this month, an appellate court in Idaho issued a written opinion affirming a jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. In the case, Hoffer v. Shappard, the court affirmed the jury’s determination that the defendant doctor was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs’ daughter after she was misdiagnosed by the defendant doctor.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiffs’ daughter was born five weeks before she was due. For the first six weeks after her birth, various doctors treated the girl and did not notice anything wrong with her. However, her mother took her to one of the defendant doctors when the girl was two months old for a regular check-up. That doctor saw the girl for five visits in total.

During the visits, the plaintiffs expressed concern that their daughter had an asymmetrical skin fold, had one leg that was significantly longer than the other, and walked on her “tippy toes.” The defendant doctor dismissed the plaintiffs’ concerns, telling them that it was normal for a child under two years old.