Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a decision potentially relevant in any lawsuit dealing with medical malpractice committed by doctors within the Armed Forces.
The case, Levin v. US, 133 S. Ct. 1224 (2013), dealt with a veteran who suffered injuries as a result of cataract surgery performed at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Guam. Just prior to the surgery, the plaintiff revoked his consent to the surgery, due to his concerns with equipment in the operating room. The surgery went ahead anyway, which resulted in his injury. He thus filed suit under the FTCA; however, as an intentional act, rather than a negligent one, the ninth circuit ruled that this case did not fall within the FTCA’s parameters, leading to this appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court engaged in an extensive discussion regarding Congress’s history of enacting agency-specific causes of action, and then reverting back to a general schema for the FTCA. Regarding medical claims, Congress passed the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act in 1976, which is commonly known as the Gonzalez Act. That Act, which is controlling in this case, makes claims against the United States under the FTCA the “exclusive” remedy for injuries resulting from malpractice committed by medical personnel of the armed forces and other specified agencies, and was thus the controlling statute for this lawsuit.