Living Essentials, LLC, the Michigan-based manufacturer of the drink marketed as 5-Hour Energy, currently faces lawsuits around the country blaming the drink’s high caffeine content for multiple injuries and deaths, or alleging that the company makes false statements regarding the drink’s contents or benefits. A nonprofit health organization recently accused the company of misquoting its executive director in an advertisement. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has named the drink in multiple reports based on consumer complaints, including thirteen fatalities, and two U.S. senators have requested to meet with the FDA regarding concerns about regulation of the beverage.

At least ninety-two FDA reports have mentioned 5-Hour Energy since 2004. Thirty-three of those reports involved hospitalizations, and thirteen involved deaths. Common caffeine-containing beverages like Coca-Cola have strict limits on their caffeine content set by the FDA, but “energy drinks” like 5-Hour Energy, Monster, and others are often labeled as “dietary supplements” rather than beverages. While a 12-ounce beverage like Coca-Cola might have an upper limit of 71 milligrams of caffeine, or roughly six milligrams per ounce, a dietary supplement does not face the same regulations. A single serving of 5-Hour Energy, sold in sixty milliliter (approx. two ounce) containers, may contain 207 milligrams of caffeine. The FDA has announced its intention to review its policies on labeling and warnings for drinks with such high caffeine content.

The company has also dealt with complaints from a non-profit science group, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI). The group accused Living Essentials of running a misleading advertisement online, which implies that the group’s executive director endorses the product’s safety. According to the CSPI, the advertisement includes a quote from the director saying that a fatal overdose is unlikely based solely on caffeine. The company suspended the advertisement in response to the group’s criticism.

Several lawsuits pending around the country are challenging the safety of 5-Hour Energy, either as a result of injury or death, or based on allegedly false or misleading statements regarding the beverage’s ingredients. A Tennessee lawsuit, Hassell v. Innovation Ventures, et al, alleges that consumption of 5-Hour Energy caused the death of the plaintiff’s husband by cardiac arrhythmia in 2009. The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and products liability, but nonsuited the case without prejudice in November 2011.

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We previously discussed a Nebraska lawsuit that invoked a statute allowing wrongful death claims on behalf of unborn children. The case involved a truck accident that took the lives of a family and their unborn child. The lawsuit, Baumann v. Slezak, et al, also invoked Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations governing the length of time truck drivers may operate a vehicle or be “on-duty.” The driver who allegedly collided with the family’s car had, according to the complaint, been driving longer than the maximum time period allowed by the regulations.

The accident occurred in the early morning of September 9, 2012. The family, which was traveling cross-country in two cars, was stopped at the rear of a traffic jam on westbound Interstate 80 in western Nebraska. A semi-truck driven by the defendant Josef Slezak approached the line of traffic at about seventy-five miles per hour. The driver allegedly failed to slow or stop the vehicle, hitting the family’s rear car at full speed. This propelled the car into the family’s other car and into another vehicle, killing the occupants of both cars.

The lawsuit names Slezak and his employer as defendants, asserting causes of action for negligence per se, violations of FMCSA regulations, and vicarious liability. The complaint accuses Slezak of violating two FMCSA regulations: a prohibition on operating a commercial motor vehicle while impaired by fatigue or some other cause, and hours-of-service (HOS) rules. Slezak had allegedly been driving for almost nineteen hours. He arrived at a terminal in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, according to the complaint, at 10:49 a.m. on September 8, 2012, and departed at 1:49 p.m. The accident occurred at about 5:19 a.m. on September 9, approximately 920 miles from Milwaukee.

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A wrongful death lawsuit arising from a Nebraska automobile accident invokes that state’s fetal death statute, reportedly for the first time since the Nebraska Legislature enacted it in 2003. The plaintiffs in Baumann v. Slezak, et al are asserting multiple causes of action in relation to the deaths of a Maryland couple, their two children, and their unborn child. The unborn child was a viable fetus at the time, which is an important distinction in some jurisdictions. The right to recover damages for the wrongful death of a person requires that the law recognize the decedent as a “person.” Nebraska’s statute explicitly applies to unborn children “at any stage of gestation,” while the District of Columbia’s statute does not mention unborn children or fetuses. Case law from DC, however has established that the law may apply to a “viable” fetus.

The accident in Nebraska occurred during the early morning of September 9, 2012. A family of four, consisting of a father, a pregnant mother, and two children, were driving through western Nebraska on their way to California. Each parent was driving a separate vehicle, and the children were riding with the mother. Traffic on westbound Interstate 80 was at a standstill because of an accident between two semi-trailers about one mile further up the road. While the family’s two cars were stopped, one behind the other, at the rear of the line of traffic, another semi-trailer approached from behind at about seventy-five miles per hour. The driver allegedly did not slow before colliding with the father’s car. This caused his car to collide with the mother’s car, propelling it under the trailer in front of her, and killing the four family members and the unborn child.

The legal representatives of the two parents filed suit on behalf of the parents, the children, and the unborn child, asserting causes of action for negligence and violations of federal trucking safety regulations. They sued the truck driver, his employer, and the driver and truck companies allegedly responsible for the accident that caused the traffic jam, asserting causes of action for negligence and violations of federal safety regulations.

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A U.S. District Court in Washington DC dismissed a lawsuit brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., against the federal government and other government entities. The plaintiff in Moorman v. United States asserted causes of action for premises liability, but did not specifically plead facts to show how the federal government, or a federal employee, was liable for her injuries. The court found that the FTCA did not apply in the absence of any allegations to demonstrate the federal government’s liability, and that as a result, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case.

The plaintiff, Jacqueline Moorman, attended an event at the D.C. National Guard Armory in March 2009. When she left the event at approximately noon, she descended an exterior stairway. A concrete step crumbled under her feet, causing her to fall and sustain substantial injuries.

Moorman sued the Washington Convention and Sports Authority (WCSA), a government board that owns the Armory. She also named the United States and the District of Columbia as defendants. According to the district court’s opinion, her allegations of premises liability centered on the WCSA, which is part of the city government of Washington, DC. The mayor appoints most of the members of WCSA’s Board of Directors, who must also be confirmed by the Washington City Council. The federal government reportedly has no direct role in the WCSA or the operation of the Armory.

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A lawsuit filed last year alleges two types of liability in a Washington DC automobile accident. The plaintiff in Lewis-Shephard v. Burch, et al filed suit against two defendants: the driver of a vehicle that allegedly struck her when she was on foot, and the owner of said vehicle. The lawsuit alleges that the driver’s negligent operation of the automobile led directly to the accident and her injuries. It also alleges that the automobile owner is liable for the plaintiff’s damages because, under D.C. law, she made the driver her agent by entrusting the vehicle to him.

The accident occurred during the afternoon of September 19, 2008. According to her complaint, the plaintiff, Kathy Lewis-Shephard, was walking east through the crosswalk on 12th Street NW, at the intersection with I Street. The vehicle driven by the defendant, Phillip Burch, Jr., was allegedly traveling west on I Street and turned right to go north on 12th Street. The plaintiff alleges that Burch failed to yield the right of way to her, and his vehicle hit her.

Lewis-Shepard filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in September 2011, asserting diversity jurisdiction between herself, a Maryland resident, and the two defendants, both New Jersey residents. She named Burch and the owner of the car Burch was allegedly driving, Agnes Dalley, as defendants.

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A medical device manufacturer moved for dismissal of a lawsuit, Marshall v. I-Flow, LLC, in a Washington DC court, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it or, alternatively, that the venue was not proper. The plaintiff had undergone surgery in upstate New York and alleged injuries caused by the defendant’s device. The court found that it had personal jurisdiction and that venue was proper, but it exercised its authority to transfer the case to New York for purposes of convenience.

The plaintiff, Jennifer L. Marshall, had surgery on her shoulder in 2006 in Syracuse, New York. Marshall was and remains a resident of Ithaca. After the surgery, her doctor implanted a “pain pump” manufactured by the defendant, I-Flow, LLC, in her shoulder joint. The pump delivered a steady stream of painkillers directly to the joint. Marshall alleges that the pump caused extensive damage to the cartilage in the joint, eventually requiring further surgery in Rochester in 2011. As of the date of the court ruling in 2012, Marshall had received a recommendation for “total shoulder replacement.”
Marshall filed suit against I-Flow, a Delaware company based in California, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2012. The lawsuit asserted various causes of action for negligence, product liability, and failure to warn. I-Flow filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, or to transfer it to the Northern District of New York.

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A federal district court in Washington DC ruled in Fonseca v. Salminen that the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) precludes a lawsuit arising from a workplace assault. While some intentional torts perpetrated by an employer against an employee are not subject to the WCA, the court found that the incident in question did not fall under any exception.

The plaintiff, Luis A. Fonseca, and the defendant, Eric Salminen, were both employees of Asbestos Specialists, Inc. (ASI), also named as a defendant. Salminen acted as Fonseca’s supervisor on an asbestos-removal job. Fonseca alleged that he was working at the job site on July 25, 2011, when Salminen suddenly hit him in the face and left eye. Salminen reportedly told responding law enforcement officers that he remembered speaking with Fonseca, but did not recall hitting him.

Fonseca filed suit against both Salminen and ASI in a District of Columbia court on July 17, 2012, asserting causes of action for assault, battery, and negligent supervision. He also sought punitive damages. Before Fonseca could obtain service on Salminen, ASI removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on September 4, asserting diversity jurisdiction. It also filed a motion for summary judgment, purportedly on behalf of itself and Salminen, arguing that he WCA precluded Fonseca’s lawsuit.

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The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered an appeal of a products liability and wrongful death claim arising from alleged asbestos exposure in railroad equipment. The decedent worked in locomotive repair for decades and died of cancer years later. The defendants argued that the federal Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) preempted the plaintiffs’ state tort claims, and the trial court and appellate court agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in a 6-3 decision in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).

The decedent, George Corson, worked for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad for about twenty-seven years, from 1947 to 1974. His job as a welder and machinist involved locomotive brakeshoe installation and insulation stripping on locomotive boilers. He allegedly came into contact with asbestos during this time. He was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in 2005.

Corson and his wife sued fifty-nine defendants, including Railroad Friction Products Corporation (RFPC) and Viad Corp in a Pennsylvania state court in 2007. The lawsuit alleged that RFCP distributed brakeshoes, that Viad was the successor-in-interest to a manufacturer and distributor of locomotives and locomotive engine parts, and that all the products in question contained asbestos. The plaintiffs asserted products liability causes of action for defective design and failure to warn. When Corson died, his executor, Gloria Kurns, joined as a plaintiff with Corson’s wife.

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Allstate Insurance Company released its eighth annual “Allstate America’s Best Drivers Report,” and Washington DC again ranked last among two hundred American cities. The survey examined its own data on accident claims to determine each city’s auto collision frequency. The cities with the lowest frequencies were deemed to have the “safest” drivers. Arlington and Alexandria, Virginia, along with Baltimore, also ranked very low on Allstate’s list. In general, smaller cities, such as the top-ranking Sioux Falls, South Dakota, have a lower incidence of car collisions, and Allstate discusses the factors that contribute to that trend.

According to Allstate, fatalities due to automobile crashes are currently at the lowest rate, nationwide, since 1949. Car accidents still account for about 32,000 deaths per year. To compile the “Best Drivers” report, Allstate reviewed actuarial data for the 200 largest U.S. cities for a two-year period, in this case 2009 and 2010, to estimate the likelihood of collisions for drivers in each city. The study calculated the average number of years a driver in a particular city may go without experiencing a collision, as well as the difference between a city’s likelihood of collisions and the national average. All of the data came from Allstate’s own claims data, so it may not present a truly accurate picture of national driver safety. Allstate claims that it provides roughly ten percent of all auto insurance policies in the country, and calls its report a “realistic snapshot” of the situation on American roads.

The top-ranking city in the study, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, has an average of 13.8 years between collisions for its drivers. Its likelihood of an accident is 27.6% below the national average. Drivers in the bottom-ranking city, Washington, DC, go an average of 4.7 years between accidents. The likelihood of an accident is 112.1% greater than, or more than double, the national average. Alexandria, Virginia has an average of 6.2 years between accidents and a collision likelihood 62.6% above the national average. For Arlington, the numbers are 6.5 years and 53.0%. Baltimore’s numbers are 5.3 years and 87.9%. These four cities in the greater DC area all ranked in the bottom ten in Allstate’s report.

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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recently entered judgments in several lawsuits against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS). The plaintiffs were victims of the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in which the government of Iran and the MOIS were implicated. The lawsuits were brought under an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), which provides a federal cause of action for injuries against a foreign state designated as a sponsor of terrorism. The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs in both cases, although the question of recovering damages from the defendants remains highly unsettled.

FSIA, which first became law in 1976, gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over most civil claims against foreign states, but applies many of the principles of sovereign immunity. This is the legal doctrine that a government entity may not be sued unless it has waived immunity. It applies in lawsuits against city, county, or state governments, where a claimant must follow steps set out by statute before filing suit. People claiming damages for injuries caused by foreign states have generally been barred from relief by this doctrine. Federal courts applied FSIA in blocking claims for damages caused by the September 11 terror attacks in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2008), and a 2003 terror attack in Riyadh in Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F.Supp.2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008).

Congress added an exception to FSIA in 1996, with amendments added in 2008, for foreign states designated as “state sponsors of terrorism” either at the time of the alleged injury or as a result of the alleged injury. The foreign state must also remain designated as such at the time a claimant files suit. The exception applies to claims for personal injuries or wrongful death resulting from acts such as hostage taking, torture, sabotage, or the support of such acts by the foreign state.

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